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I. Introduction
On a foggy March morning in 1895 in Peru, the forces under 
NicoMs de Pidrola began a two-day siege on the capital city, Lima. 
This siege led to the overthrow of the military regime of President 
Andrds A. Ciceres and the eventual presidency of Pidroia himself 
from 1895 to 1899. The rebellion brought to an end almost ten 
years of national rule by Ciceres, including four years from 1890 to 
1894 when a hand-picked supporter Remigio Morales Bermddes held 
the presidency. Between the end of the War with Chile in 1883 and 
the end of Pidrola's presidency in 1899 Peru experienced dynamic 
change. Evolving from a country with suspended foreign debt 
payments and a weak central government, she greeted the twentieth 
century with a vigorous economy and a government that was firmly 
entrenched.
This turn around hinged on the civil war of 1895. The war 
featured two contributing elements which had not previously come 
into play to bring about a change of government in Peru's history: a 
political coalition, and active involvement of the population. 
Understanding the significance of this civil war lies in understanding 
the role these two key elements played. The coalition between 
Pidrola's Democratic Party and the Civilista Party representing the 
coastal agricultural exporting elite and Lima commercialists brought 
an end to over twenty years of animosity between these two groups. 
This coalition became the driving force behind the economic
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3turnaround during Pidrola's presidency. The active and crucial 
involvement of the popular montonera fighting forces agtluit Cfcersi 
army brought to the fees die itnitortuhoe of the pepuiut suefue la 
government, th e  challenge for the Ptdreta administration then tap in 
the complicated task of representing the Interests not only of the 
members of the coalition, but the newly mobilised population as well.
Scholars have studied the events of 1893 from differing angles 
and in varying depth. Of those historians who have covered Peru's 
history more extensively, Jorge Basadre is surely the most
extensive factual account of the rebellion giving some insight into the 
attitude of the times. Basadre sees the civil war as falling into the 
same pattern as those before it since Peru's independence. Yet he 
does recognise that with 1895 there is a subtle change. He asserts 
that this rebellion is an alliance of the "real state" (the citizens 
themselves) with tbe "legal state" (the political elite) in opposition to 
Cdceres' government.1 While not exploring the causes for this 
alliance or its implications for the Pidrola administration he does 
make this critical observation.
The Peruvian sociologist Julio Cotier, offers an enlightening 
insight into Ms era in his book fflfHfll, tffifP*Q v npeida an «1 Mm. 
Concerned with the formation of a Peruvian nation Ire considers the 
effects of the civil war on this process. Toward this aim Cotier views 
the Pidrola administration as a purely transitional one that relieved 
Pent of the militarism of Cfceres and turned state control over to the
expert}*! elite.2 In explaining the cause of the extensive 
mobilisation of the papulation hi cites the depreciation of sliver.2 
With the im p in Mu value nf silver the urbaa popnlace, artisans and 
the "proletertlt” suffered a substantial less in their purchasing 
capacity. This, he says, lead in 1893 to •  stupe of popular iNtt- 
Clcerista groups whose cause PMfoth captained, eventually 
overthrowing Ciceros in 1893. Yet, while the Piirola administration 
may have brought about die transition of power to the exporting 
elite, it had its own objectives as well. And while the depreciation of 
silver was possibly one of the precipitating causes of the massive 
popular uprising it was not the sole cause. Thus, while Cotier has 
correctly pinpointed two significant aspects of the civil war of 1894- 
93, in failing to see its other causes, he also fails to perceive the 
larger implications of this event.
Dealing with more specific issues, Ptoroncia Mellon's Tho
relating the experiences of the sesvano papulation of Pens. Yet in 
looking at the rebellion of 1994-93 she deals only with the effect 
Pidrola’s government had on this region once he was in office, 
completely ignoring the role this region's montonera groups played 
in the rebellion itself. MaHon characterises Pidrola's government as a 
"enconamuctionist coalition."4 She claims that it represents Limefta, 
coastal, sad regional elites in search of new opportunities for 
investment and greater control over the tower desses.3 While this 
group was intenmad in part ia new Investments, she views the
5members of the coalition far too homogenously. Further, her 
tIMftfoe regarding the lower classes is a contradiction to the fact 
that it was exactly these people who helped this coalition achieve 
power.
Kory Miller addresses the period 1895-1919 which he calls the 
"republics aristocritica," in an article entitled "The Coastal Elite and 
Peruvian Politics: 1895-1919."* In this article he attempts to define 
the social and political elements which the Civilista Party 
represented. Although he concentrates on the 1914-1910 period he 
does make the relevant assertion that the ruling oligarchy of this 
whole period is composed of elites from the north coast and Lima as 
well as the siem  and the South. In this way he recognizes the 
coalition of interests that Pidrola assumed upon taking office. Yet he 
portrays Pidrola's administration as representative of the elite only 
and neglects consideration of the Democrat's popular support.
Finally Ronald Berg and Frederick Weaver in one article, and 
Stephen Gorman in another, on political change in Peru in the 
nineteenth Century offer an overarching interpretation of Pidrola's 
coalitional government and its implications. Both articles see the 
government of 1895 as composed of coastal exporting elites in 
conjunction with elites form other regions of Peru. While the authors 
differ on the historical strength this group possessed they conclude 
that this group guided the state toward its particular exporting 
interests once in power. But they fail to recognize the contribution of 
the middle and lower cltss citizens in bringing about "political
change." Thus, while numerous studies have looked at the civil war 
of 1895, and its implications in part, so far no one has written 
specifically on the factors leading to this rebellion and the immediate 
as well ts  long term implications of its success for the parties 
involved and the nation as a whole.
The purpose of this paper is to define the economic, political, 
and social factors which prevailed during the time of Peru's civil war 
in 1895, and in considering these factors to determine the role they 
played in bringing about this war. I will look at the effects of these 
factors on the coastal elite represented by the Civillsta Party, as well 
as the southern and other provincial landowners and merchants who 
represented the Democratic Party, which also received support from 
middle and lower classes. Beyond looking at the motivating factors 
drawing these groups into civil war I will also discuss the 
significance of the new ruling class after the civil war, in terms of 
how it affected these various sectors.
After a brief overview of the trends leading up to the civil war 
in 1895 the heart of the paper will begin with a look at the nature of 
politics in Peru prior to the civil war. I will then go on to discuss the 
civil war itself and the political and economic significance of the 
coalition between Pidrola's Democratic Party and the Civilista Party 
of the oligarchy. A discussion on the montonera fighting forces from 
various regions of Peru who supported Pidrola will follow. Here I 
shall try to determine the factors which motivated them to take up 
arms and fight. Finally the paper will close with a look at the
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Democratic - Civilista coalition, how it functioned once in power, and 
what policies it pursued. In this way this paper will analyze the 
political, economic, and social factors which converged to bring an 
end to the CAceres regime and to install the Pidrola administration, 
which launched Peru into modern times.
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II. Peru's Economy and Society in 1895
fern, lacaicd on die Pacific com  of Latin America is a nation of 
extreme geographical diversity. Her coastline roes 1,200 miles from 
north to south, consisting meetly of desert, interrupted only by rivers 
rutming into the Pacific.7 Less than 100 miles inland the landscape 
takes oa an abrupt change as one enters the Andean mountains.
With some peaks as high as 21,000 feet in elevation. Mid many 
reaching 18,000 feet these ranges run from die northwest to the
ithenet for the length of die country. This region covers about one 
fourth of the area of the country.8 Passing through the mountain 
ranges, heading eastward one comes upon the vast montafia, or 
forest-land. This area comprises fully two thirds of Peru's land 
surface.9 In die nineteenth century this area was, and still is, largely 
uninhabited, consisting of rugged foothill and lowland tropical 
jungles. Thus white Peru covers more than 600,000 square miles,10 
large portions of this area cannot be put to productive use because of 
geographic conditions. At the turn of the century the population of 
Peru stood near 3.67 million people. The smallest sector was 
attributed to the montafia, 400,000, and the largest to the sierra 
region, 2,360,00, while the coast was reported to have 800,000 
people.11
Off the central and southern coast lay a number of small 
islands. These islands are the traditional resting place for the huge
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9flocks of soa birds in the region. Over time the dung of these birds, 
called guano, was deposited in huge quantities on these islands. Peru 
began le export this guano to Europe as fertilizer in the 1840s. >2 
Through the ISdOs Peru earned huge profits from the sate of guano, 
and was able to obtain loans for infrastructural investments based on 
future sates of this fertilizer. Guano became the magic money-maker 
for Peru. But as the 1860s came to a close the quality and quantity 
of guano began to decline rapidly, in 1868, even after having 
received a loan for 16 million soles (Peruvian currency worth about 
1 U.S. $ each at that time) based mi future guano sates, Peru faced a 
budget deficit of 17 million sides.13 This was only the beginning of 
Peru's financial problems.
In 1869 young NicoMs de Pterola, finance minister of President 
Jos< Balta conceived a dramatic plan to rectify the financial crisis. He 
cancelled the consignment contracts held by coastal commercMist 
groups who would later form themselves into the Civilista Party. The 
rights that had been held by these individuals to sell guano on the 
international market, he than sold as a unit to the Dreyfus Company 
of Prance. In return, Peru received an immediate payment of 2.4 
million soles, and future remittances of 700,000 soles per month for 
20 months, as well as other obligations.14
While this stopgap measure helped for a time Peru soon faced 
financial troubles again. By the time Civilista President Manuel 
Pardo took office in 1872 the external debt, which had been 8 million 
pounds sterling in 1868, had reached 23 million pounds sterling.19
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But in 1873 the European banking system met with a period of crisis, 
making it impossible for Pardo to borrow in order to pay for Peru's 
outstanding debts. Through the mid-1870s Peru's exports and 
imports continued to fall, due primarily to the decline of guano. In 
addition to this there was a general loss of confidence in the 
Peruvian paper currency leading to a collapse of the banking system 
in Lima.16 On the first of January, 1876 Pardo finally had to 
suspend payment on the foreign debt.17 In a period of one decade 
the Peruvian economy had devolved from an ailing economy to full 
scale collapse.
And, as the 1870s drew to a close Peru's difficulties were far 
form over. In 1879 Peru entered into a war with Chile known as the 
War of the Pacific, which did not end until 1883 with Chile's 
withdrawal from a devastated Peru. The war was a result of a 
dispute over valuable nitrate fields along the Bolivian and southern 
Peruvian coast. After Bolivia's nitrate fields had been invaded by 
Chile she called on Peru for assistance, based on a mutual defense 
treaty the two countries had signed in 1874. After extended efforts 
at negotiating a peaceful settlement Peru finally grudgingly declared 
war on Chile.18
For Peru the war resulted in the loss of one nitrate rich 
department (Tarapacd) and the Chilean occupation of two others 
(Tacna and Arica). But that was only a small measure of Peruvian 
losses. The war had a devastating impact on most aspects of the 
Peruvian economy and society:
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Thousands of the nation's young men had been 
killed or maimed. The transportation system was 
in shambles. Irrigation works and farm equipment 
on the coastal estates had been destroyed, 
spoilated, or neglected. The war had uprooted and 
dispersed the labor force. The mining industry 
almost ceased to exist and the commercial 
establishments of Lima lacked the capital to resume 
their activities. The national treasury remained 
empty and the towering public debt seemed 
unbearable with the loss of the nitrate industry.
The people had no confidence in their political 
institutions and the republics civilian leadership . . .
. A deep despair and mortification permeated the 
country19
In 1884, with the collapse of her economy compounded by the 
devastation of the war Peru was impotent to revitalize the nation.
As a consequence Peru found herself dependent on direct foreign 
investment to fulfill this role. During the mid-1880s a number of 
foreign investors from England, Germany, Italy and North America 
began purchasing large coastal sugar estates. This led to the 
concentration of landholdings in these areas, displacing many smaller 
landowners. It was these investors who had access to the capital 
which would turn the sugar industry into its modern and mechanized 
form by the 1890s.20
While these investments restabilized and improved the 
agricultural exporting sector, Peru realized after the fall of guano 
exports that she could no longer rely on a single export sector for 
revenue. The government saw the need to invest in a variety of
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export sectors such as other agricultural products and mining. With 
this in mind Peru sought to clear her foreign debts and reestablish 
access to the international capital market. As the 1880s drew to a 
close Peru was finally able to agree upon a plan which would bail her 
out of her depressing financial straits, at a dear price. The plan, 
signed in 1889 is called the Grace Contract. It was named after 
Englishman Michael Grace who along with a group of foreign 
investors organized together to form the Peruvian Corporation with 
whom Peru signed the contract. The contract accomplished two 
important goals. First, the signers agreed to assume Peru's external 
debt of fifty million pounds sterling, thus restoring her external 
credit and allowing her to obtain foreign capital. Secondly, the 
signers agreed to repair the railroad lines damaged in the war and 
expand them into the mining districts, thus stimulating investment.
In exchange for this assistance, Peru granted to the investors: 1)
ownership of the railroads for 66 years, 2) rights to export three tons 
of guano 3) free use of seven secondary ports, 4) permission to 
navigate lake Titicaca, S) one million acres of land in the Montafia, 
and finally, 6) payment of 80,000 pounds sterling a year for 33 
years.21
But even as Peru was signing the Grace Contract another 
problem in her economy began to take on greater proportions. The 
price of silver, the base of Peru's currency and mainstay of her 
economy was on a steady decline. By the early 1890s this was 
becoming a serious problem. One obvious result of the depreciation
13
of the price of silver on the world market was the distortion it 
brought about between the coastal exporting economy and the 
economy of the interior. The depreciation of silver actually 
strengthened the coastal export economy. Because they exported 
their goods (sugar and cotton), receiving payment in gold reserves, 
they had a much greater domestic purchasing power. On the other 
hand, southern landowners, who produced goods for the internal 
market, or whose goods (wool) were purchased with silver by 
commercial houses in Peru who then exported them to Europe and 
the U.S., were comparatively losing purchasing power. Since nearly 
one fourth of foodstuffs were imported,22 the proletarian and 
artisanal classes who operated solely within the domestic economy 
felt the pinch as they lost purchasing power as well.23
After the signing of the Grace Contract until the collapse of 
silver prices, which occurred in 1892, Peru experienced a steady 
stream of foreign investment. British capital entered Peru and was 
invested in die railways, the oil industry, mining, and the cotton 
textile industry, with investment in sugar having already begun in 
the mid-1880s.24 But with the collapse of silver prices British 
investment fell off. The appeal of the silver mines, a central British 
concern, had waned and Peru's credit-worthiness came back into 
question. In 1893 the world economy experienced a depression. 
With these prospects facing Peru, she was forced to rely on her own 
resources to stabilize her economy.
But, in the remaining year and a half of Bermdde* 
administration, 1893-94, the economy saw no immediate recovery. 
During the latter part of this period the montonera forces began to 
take up arms in the provinces, interrupting the stability of the 
country as it became obvious that Cdceres intended to retake the 
reins of government. As the potential for civil war increased, 
tensions rose and trade began to falter. At the close of Bermddez' 
administration the Peruvian economy, shaken by the decline in silver 
prices in 1892, the world depression of 1893, and the internal 
upheavals in 1893-94, was in poor health.
As the mid-1890s came to a close Peru was on the verge of 
calamitous change. But this was a country of not only geographic 
diversity, but of cultural and economic diversity as well. It had a 
population of almost 4 million people with more than half (57%) 
consisting of Indians and another 23% being of mixed Indian and 
white or Indian aad negro Mood. The remaining 20% were 
descendeats of the Spanish settlers.23 On the verge of modernity,
Pare was one of Ae oldest of Spain's former Latin American 
peeteaaiom, aad her city-scapes reveal this fact. This is best 
evidenced in Ae Lima Cathedral founded in 1535 by Francisco 
Pizasea himself, the "conquerer" of Peru.26 In the grand city of Lima 
hi 1804 could he found members of Peru's most prosperous and 
progressive families; the Miro Quesadas, the Aspillagas, the Prados 
aad the Pardos.27 At the same time, working on a hacienda high hi 
As central slams one coaid see some of the poorest of ladiaa
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peasants. In the South, lay the "quaint city of Arequipa," home to the 
devoutly Catholic descendants of Spanish aristocracy, marked by its 
poverty.28 And on the north coast lay the booming sugar and cotton 
plantations owned by progressive exporting hacendados.
While these sectors seemed to have little in common given in 
the above description, the civil war of 1895 proved this assertion to 
be false. After the unexpected death of Morales Bertmidez and 
Ciceres illegal re-entrance to the presidency, the country rose up in 
opposition. For members of the exporting elite as well as provincial 
hacendados and middle to lower class working groups, Ciceres* 
military backed, clientelistic regime was no longer acceptable.
Rather than allow Ciceres to further his own and his supporter's 
interests, these groups banded together to oust him and install in his 
place a legal, democratic government.
III. The Dynamics of Contemporary Politics.
Politics it. Peru in the nineteenth century was historically very 
personalistic and regionalistic. The political strongman who arose in 
the mid-nineteenth century was the "caudillo." He was often a man 
of mestizo birth who "was a petty-bourgeois entrepreneur who could 
afford to finance his own start in the profession of arms, assumed the 
title of colonel, and then sought a political-military base of operations 
in one of the provincial centers of the interior."29 Once in power this 
caudillo would orient the privileges of the state toward his own goals 
and those of his regional supporters. In this way power over the 
state became the key to personal security and regional hegemony.
Over time the various regional elites became transplanted 
permanently in Lima where they began to develop economic and 
social roots. After a time this more nebulous group began to take on 
particularized interests of its own, primarily in commercial and 
exporting activity.30 While even into the 1890s, elements of 
personalism prevailed, Peruvian politics had begun to take on some 
aspects of diffusion into at least group interests if not party interests.
But the political system in Peru was a system of the "elite" and 
for the "elite." Even as late as the turn of the century, after a direct 
suffrage law had been passed in 1896, the voting population was just 
over 100,000 people -  in a nation of 4 million!31 In talking about
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"politics in Peru" one is very clearly discussing a very small, albeit 
powerful minority.
By the last decade of the nineteenth century, three viable 
political parties had been formed in Peru: the Democrats, the
Civilistas and the Constitutionalists. The Democrats were founded 
and led by NicolAs de Pidrola in conjunction with some Lima and 
southern coastal aristocratic elites. In addition to representing this 
group, the Democrats also claimed the support of the urban artisanal 
and proletariat class as well as some traditional landowners and 
merchants in the interior. The Civilistas represented the "Lima 
elite," with commercial interests in Lima, and the producers of 
coastal export crops such as sugar and cotton. Finally the 
Constitutionalist party was a clientelist party run by Andrds CAceres 
and maintained through the distribution of political favors in 
exchange for support. This party enjoyed the backing of the military.
The civil war of 1893 represented the eclipse of the interests of 
the C&cerista group by those of a combined Democrat-Civilista 
movement. Yet, to understand how this configuration came about it 
is important to look briefly at each of these parties and their 
programs.
It was not by a fluke that CAceres obtained the presidency in 
1886, a few years after the war with Chile. CAceres had emerged as 
a great national hero. After the defeat of Peru's regular army, he 
bravely fought on as "Political and Military Chief of the Central 
Highlands" in what is known as the "Battle of La Breiia." He
17
organized montoneras in the sierra to combat the Chilean invaders 
from May 1881 to February 1882. In 1884 President Miguel de 
Iglesias signed a peace treaty, the Treaty of Anc6n, with the Chileans, 
conceding Peruvian territory to Chile. Ciceres then launched a 
military campaign to overthrow Iglesias, finally ousting him on 
December 2, 1885. On the tenth of August, 1886, Ciceres and his 
constitutionalist party were legally installed into power signifying 
the final restoration of peace.32 Cdceres had won with the support of 
Civilistas who saw him as a stabilizing force, but faced total 
opposition from the Democrats.33 Yet in ten short years there would 
be a complete shift of alignments, and the Civilistas, who so quickly 
embraced the stability of the military-backed regime of Ciceres 
would begin to feel stifled by this same regime and seek to improve 
their situation through an alliance with the Democrats.
But in 1886 many Peruvians welcomed a military strongman as 
president with open arms. Ciceres had the support of the montonera 
forces form the central sierra, consisting of the Indian peasants and 
the lower and middle class citizens of the small communities of the 
region, whom he had lead so valiantly in the battle against Chile. He 
also had the backing of the Lima exporting elites who saw in him the 
guarantor of stability so desperately needed to revitalize die 
economy. In addition to supplying a stabilizing force with the army 
Ciceres professed as a goal the restoration of Peru's republican 
institutions.34
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Yet while he fulfilled the former he did not keep with the 
latter. Shortly after coming into power CAceres' administration 
devolved into an "ironclad dictatorship," quickly losing its civilian 
support.35 Under this authoritarian guise CAceres instituted an 
austerity program alienating the population even further. He 
imposed new taxes and currency reform to stabilize the inflated 
paper sol ( Peru's national currency). The stabilization of the sol hurt 
the exporters by increasing the price of their goods in foreign 
markets. Thus CAceres lost support among the powerful coastal 
exporters.36 Furthermore he moved to suppress all municipal 
elections, installing instead appointed town councils from the ranks 
of his own supporters.37
But the most significant and controversial accomplishment of 
the CAceres administration was the signing of the Grace Contract. 
Based on the terms die mussed above, the majority felt that Peru was 
far too generous in the agreement with her foreign creditors. Most 
importantly the people felt that national pride had been damaged 
with the loss of the national railroads for 66 years.36
Hie policies of the CAceres administration during the late 1880s 
had two significant results. First, although they were highly 
unpopular, the measures contributed to the economic stability which 
the PiArola administration would later take advantage of, and to the 
political cohesion, which even if brought about by force, the country 
needed to revitalize itself. Secondly, in taking these steps the 
CAceres administration distanced itself from all but a handful of
supporters and provoked the opposition that would eventually lead 
to its own downfall.
One of the key sectors of support from which Ciceres was 
gradually severed was that of the coastal elites of the Civilista party. 
It is ironic that this group would ever have been associated with 
Ciceres' military regime given its obvious bias toward civilian 
government, the capstone of its political credo. The party was 
founded in 1872 by Manuel Pardo, a businessman from Lima who 
came from a family of statesmen. It was formed to support Pardo's 
candidacy for president in 1872, and from the outset represented the 
interests of the commercial bourgeoisie. This was an attempt to rise 
above the "personalism" which was so prevalent in Peruvian politics 
up to that time, and to present a party program in its place.39
The members of the party consisted of the group often referred 
to as the oligarchy. This group consisted of successful businessmen, 
and "well-connected members of the liberal professions."40 It was 
the party of those who had "arrived." The concerns of this party 
were in the modem sectors: the coastal plantations, mining, Lima
commercial houses, bankers and manufacturers. This party 
represented the upper crust of Peruvian society. In this sense it was 
more forward looking than the Constitutionalist party, although it 
was founded more than ten years earlier.
The Civilista party was also "modem" in another sense. Unlike 
the personalistic style of previous parties, the Civilistas had a 
program which laid out their priorities and goals. Stephen Gorman
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has summarized the three major tenets of Civilism and what they 
meant in real practice as follows: (1) Democracy: "an aristocratic 
republic in which the great families would have kept under their 
tutelage the inert peasant masses, the soldiery and the Lima 
proletariat, (2) Modernization: an expansion of export and its
supporting infrastructure (ports and railroads) together with the 
establishment of industries to process export products and increase 
their prices, (3) The absolute subordination of the military to civilian 
authority. . . to be achieved through scaling back expenditures for the 
army."41 In addition the Civilistas objected to the intervention of 
clergy into politics.42
Thus the Civilistas' program was directly opposed to that of the 
Constitutionalists in a number of ways. The Civilistas promoted 
modernizing investments while the Constitutionalists imposed 
austerity measures. The Civilistas promoted improving the 
agricultural exporting economy while the C&ceristas initiated 
programs which countered this economic sector. Finally, by design 
the Civilistas supported a civilian government, while, the 
constitutionalists supported a military-backed, highly personalistic 
government.
By the early 1890s, during the Bermddez administration, the 
differences between these two parties began to overcome the bonds 
that held them together. The Civilistas were interested in pursuing 
export production and commercialization while the Constitutionalists 
were obsessed with maintaining power. Yet, the Civilistas did not
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have wide enough electoral support to win the presidential election 
of 1894.49 The alternative was to join with the Democratic Party to 
form an electoral coalition. This coalition must have come as a 
surprise to contemporaries. Historically the Democrats and the 
Civilistas had been archenemies. This animosity began in 1869 
when Pidrola, acting as finance minister under President Balta, 
cancelled the guano consignment contracts of this same Lima 
commercialist group, as mentioned above. Further, in December 
1879, Pidrola slighted this group when he staged a forceful takeover 
of the government from Civilista President Mariano Ignacio Prado 
during the war with Chile.44 As a result of his actions Pidrola and 
this group had been in opposition. And as late as the elections in 
1890 there was still animosity between the Pidrolistas and the 
Civilistas. On March first of that year, for example a mob of 
Pidrolistas attacked a crowd of the Civilista presidential candidate's 
supporters during a political rally held in Lima.49 Obviously the 
interceding years between this event and the coalition formed in 
1894 brought about a change in attitude in the leadership of both 
parties which we need to explore below.
When Pidrola formed the Democratic Party in July of 1884 the 
contrast between this party and both the Civilista and 
Constitutionalist Parties loomed large. Pidrola's party was meant to 
promote the "democratic" ideas of its founder and his associates. As 
a result of the political chaos of the War of the Pacific and the 
humiliating Treaty of Anc6n Pidrola and his followers were anxious
22
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to reestablish stability for the country and regain Peru's honor.46 In 
their eyes the establishment of a political party offered the most 
effective means of achieving this goal.
Josd Nicolis Baltasar de Pidrola y Villena was bom on the fifth 
of January, 1839 in the southern city of Arequipa, the country's 
second city and perennial launching ground for rebellions. Being a 
devout Catholic he entered the seminary in 1833. He decided not to 
complete his training though and instead became involved in 
business and printing in Arequipa.47 Arequipa is a city with a large 
number of aristocratic Spanish descendents. Because of this heritage 
these are a conservative people. Pidrola was no exception. He saw 
the world order as preordained by God. This view included 
economic inequalities and racial differences. Thus while he sought 
to protect the poor and the Indians he was not compelled to bring 
them equality.48
Pidrola first came on the political scene as the Minister of 
Finance under President Jose Balta in 11694* Even at die young age 
of 30 he was called a "vendor of hopes," referring te his charismatic 
style of speech before Congress.50 Yet the financial situation of die 
Balta government had little hope to offer due to the decline in guano 
exports and the increasing foreign debt the government faced. So, to 
generate revenue Pidrola made a daring move. In one fell swoop 
Pidrola he cancelled the consignment contracts and signed with the 
Dreyfus Co. under the terms listed above, to set Peru back on stable 
financial footing, at least temporarily. But, while Pifrola solved the
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immediate financial problem, he simultaneously brought on himself 
the long term animosity of the coastal merchant groups, the core of 
the future Civilistas whose consignment contracts he had cancelled.
After resigning his ministerial post in 1872 Pterola spent the 
rest of the decade in a seemingly incessant effort to topple the 
national government, now controlled by his recently made enemies, 
the newly formed Civilista Party, But the uprisings incited by 
Pidrola in 1874, 187%, and 1877, failed to receive sufficient support 
to achieve their goat Finally, with the onset of the War of the 
Pacific in 187% his hour had come. As Chile invaded, President 
Mariano Prado left for Europe, supposedly to acquire aims for Peru. 
Within days Pidrola and his forces, called the Ouardia Peruana 
attacked Callao. After a day-long battle against the forces wider 
General Lull La Puerta, to Whom Prado had turned over power 
before leaving for Europe, Pidrola's forces finally took Callao.
Donning the title "Supreme Chief" Ptdvota took power on the 23ad of 
December.Sl But his hold on power, referred to as "the Dictatorship^ 
lasted only two yean. It came to an end when he was forced to 
retreat into the mountains after being defeated by the Chilean 
army.52
In 1884 Pidrola gathered with his closest political allies to form 
the Democratic Party. After his defeat at the hands of the Chileans 
in 1881 and his subsequent loss of power, Pidrola had looked to the 
political system as a legitimate pathway to government. This group 
published the tenets of their new party in a pamphlet entitled
"Declaracidn de Principios."33 Of the eleven men who signed the 
document, information on two is available. Benjamin Boza, one of 
the signers was a lawyer from the southern coastal province of lea. 
He worked as the superintendent of the railroad from Pisco to lea 
until 1881, then moving to Lima.34 The other identifiable signer 
was Ricardo Flores who was a doctor as well as a politician from 
Lima.33 Both of these men were definitely of the upper class, 
judging from their education and employment. Yet while one was a 
Limeflo the other was from a southern department. This I think 
gives an accurate impression of the type of party leadership the 
Democrats had: rich, aristocratic, but representing the southern
departments as well as Lima (especially Arequipa).
The "Declaracidn" itself discusses four elements: Political 
parties: these should not represent personal interests, but the good
of the whole; Democracy: means that all people are equal before the 
law; The Population: emphasizing the need to improve the life of the 
Indians M id increase immigration to spur development; and Land: 
emphasizing the importance of infrastructure building and 
agriculture for prosperity.36 In these four areas the Democrats 
found their greatest concerns. Also in these principles the 
paternalistic tendency of this class is evident. They saw it ^s part of 
their duty to protect the less fortunate classes.
One of the principles which reveals this protective tendency of 
the Democratic elite is that of democracy -- equality before the law. 
This had a great appeal to the peasant population which was
25
26
normally considered inferior. But even more revealing is the 
emphasis this party's program placed on the improvement of the 
Indian. This was novel in the area of politics and most likely drew 
positive feedback from the large Indian population. To the middle 
classes, the emphasis on development was an appeal to their needs. 
Thus in thi3 basic document the Democrats put forth their program, 
and did so keeping in mind the lower classes, whom they feel bound 
to protect. As an addendum to its "Declaracidn" the Democrats 
detailed their party's "Constitucidn e Instituciones Polfticas" in 1889. 
Within this section is listed a large number of rights due the citizens, 
and first on the list are individual guarantees: life, property, liberty
and honor.37 For the leaders of this party such virtues as honor we 
of the utmost importance. Honor is described as "moral sensibility, 
in sum, without which man is not possible, much less society."58 
This gives some insight into the truly aristocratic nature of the 
leadership of this party. On a more practical, goal-oriented level the 
"Constitucidn" lists as objectives: the right of direct election by 
"able" citizens; the very important duty of maintaining internal and 
external credit for the state; the need for the currency to be based 
on the gold standard with silver and copper used only aa auxiliary 
currency; an emphasis on the importance of moving away from the 
production of only primary products toward industrialisation; and 
education of mind , body and spirit.59
By the 1890s the Democratic Party had a large following.
While its leadership tended to be recruited from wealthier and more
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socially prominent families, the rank and file came from the middle 
and lower classes. Support in the urban areas came from small 
merchants, moderately successful professional men, white collar 
workers, artisans and other skilled workers. In addition Pidrola was 
very popular throughout the provincial areas. Traditional 
landowners and provincial businessmen offered him their support. 
And he was especially popular in his home department of Arequipa 
where he had been a businessman and printer. 60 In addition to 
these, Pidrola, being a devout Catholic was supported by the 
clergy,61 and staunchly Catholic laymen.
In looking at their agenda it becomes clear that the Democrats 
had a number of things in common with the Civilistas. Both 
represented the upper class in their leadership, while the Civilistas 
tended to be of die more progressive Lima commercialist group and 
the Democrats of the more traditional gentile aristocracy. In 
addition both were concerned about international trade and 
development of the country. And both parties were civilian parties 
who M  not want to make fundamental changes in the structure of 
society.62 As the Bermddez administration progressed and the 
Civilistas and Constitutionalists drifted apart the possibility of a 
CiviNsta • democrat coalition began to seem more real.
The administration of President Remigio Moralez Bermddez 
from IBPO-1894 is often overlooked in terms of its policies. This is 
because it is assumed to have been a puppet front for Andrds 
Gfceres who held dm presidency before, and for a brief period, after
Berinddez' administration. But in terms of the civil war of 1894-95 
this time pei d was crucial in the formation of the rebellion.
On turning over the presidency to Bermudez in 1890, Cdceres 
was apparently nsiderii,fc ■ plan for his own reelection in 1894, 
after staying out vi power for the constitutionally required term. By 
putting in a fellow party member and his own vice-president from 
1886 -1890, Cdceres insured compliance for his bid again in 1894. 
But it was only through the political influence of Mariano Nicolds 
Vale dree I, president of the House of Representatives, that Bermudez 
was elected.63 In the Congressional elections of 1890, all but one of 
the senators elected were of the Civilista Party, while a majority of 
the men elected to the House of Representatives were 
Constitutionalists.64 Thus the Bermddez administration from the 
beginning was faced with divisive political support.
Beginning in 1890, one year after the signing of the Grace 
Contract, the economy experienced an encouraging period of growth. 
Although it wasn't by Bermddez' design his administration enjoyed 
the beginning of a turn-around in the economy. H e  moat narable 
improvement was in the railroad extensions tyteunged tBreugb 
Grace Contract. The Central railroad was extended to l a  Oroya in 
1893, creating a transportation network for the silver and capper 
mines. H e  railroad was extended from Puno to Sacaant in the South 
by 1894 65 In addition to this, British investors pm money into a 
number of export sectors in the first (are years e l tbc HJ908, such as 
sugar and cotton. But with the cottepee of afivec pefcea. on which
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Peru's monetary system was t used, on the world market in 1892 
the economy slumped once again. The world recession of 1893 only 
reinforced these stained economic conditions.
Because of this aborted conomic recovery Peru's ei >nomy 
simply plateaued during t.ie i 72-94 period. After reaching a post­
war peak of 16 million pesos in 1887-88, government revenues fell 
to 7 million in 1892 and remained at that level through 1894.66 
Even though mining export taxes had been frozen for twenty-five 
years in 1890,67 and the railroads had been extended, the Peruvian 
economy lay dormant in 1894, waiting for new capital to bring it 
back to life.
In addition to the disappointing performance of the economy, 
Bermiidez began to face stronger political opposition. In the 
congressional elections of 1892 even Valc&rcel, who still professed to 
be pro-Cdcerista, supported the candidacies of some of the 
opposition members. In this same year Valc&rcel would eventually 
shift his support to the Civilista party.6* This marked the point in 
which legitimate political support of the Bermiidez administration 
began to dissipate. This shift in support, which I will discuss in 
depth resulted from an unavoidable conflict of interests between the 
Bermiidez government and the Civilistas. While the Civilistas saw a 
blatant need for emphasis on investment in the economy to 
revitalize it, the Ciceristas were simply too preoccupied with 
maintaining power and placating their own support groups to attend 
to this need. Bermiidez was prepared to withstand the opposition
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with force. With the next presidential election coming up in 1894 
Ciceros' military party needed to reassert its authority to insure its 
hold on power. Thus when, in municipal elections in the provinces 
in 1893, some Ciceros supporters lost the election, the Bermudez 
government stepped in to replace the victorious officials with 
"juntas of notables" who were Ciceristas.69
As the Bermtidez administration drew to an end and the 
elections of 1894 grew closer, tension increased. With a 
preponderance of Civilistas and the new anti-Ciceristas followers of 
Valcircel in congress, the political balance had swung away from the 
Constitutionalists. As the Bermudez government began to resort 
more and more to force in order to maintain its hold on power the 
middle and lower class sectors of the communities as well as the 
leaders of the political opposition were provoked into action. As the 
election of 1894 drew near speculation about Ciceros' intentions was 
rampant and tensions were high. No one knew what would happen 
but each side was ready to see its own scenario played out.
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IV. The Civil War of 1895: The Events
While, during his administration, CAceres had received 
cooperation on th* part of the Civilistas, with the elections of 1890 
this tide turned. The Civilistas proposed their own candidate, 
Francisco Rosas, in opposition to CAcerista, Morales Bermudez.70 And 
after the elections, when Rosas was serving as president of the 
Senate, he proposed offering amnesty to PiArola for the "criminal” 
dictatorship during 1881-82 which CAceres had accused him of.71 In 
1886 CAceres had passed a law which declared the acts of the 
PiArola dictatorship and Igiesias' regime as criminal and had even 
imprisoned PiArola in 1890 for this "crime."72 When Rosas suggested 
the amnesty offering, PiArola was in exile in Chile. This is evidence 
of the growing desire for administrative independence and control 
on the part of the Civilistas who had previously contented 
themselves with supporting a favorable administration.
In an effort to consolidate opposition to the CAceristas further, 
two opposing factions joined together. Mariano NicolAs ValcArcel, 
who had been a CAcerista supporter up to this point, had a large 
following among deputies as president of the House of 
Representatives. He informally joined these deputies in the so called 
Parliamentary Circle.72 The other faction was headed by Francisco 
Rosas the Civilista president of the Senate, almost entirely made up 
of members of this party. In a meeting held on October 14, 1892
these two groups joined forces calling the new party the Civic 
Union.74 It seems clear that this was strictly an electoral co ition. 
These two groups joined in anticipation of the upcoming presidential 
elections in 1894. Fearing that each group alone could not difeat 
the Cdceristas, they chose this defensive tactic of joint opposition.
As early as 1892 the Civic Union began to discuss with the 
Democrats the prospects of a coalition for the upcoming election in 
1894. Finally, on March 30, 1894, two days before the election was 
to take place, the Democrats and the Civic Union signed a coalitional 
pact. The objective of this pact was to insure the freedom to vote 
for all citizens, in opposition to the expected corruption of the 
upcoming election.73 As the election drew near it became clear that 
Ciceres intended to win by any means. This attitude on Cftceres' 
part rendered the seemingly minor goal of the coalition for electoral 
freedom a major consideration.
But, President Morales Bermiidez' unexpected illness and 
subsequent death on April 1st lead to a postponement of the 
election. Confusion now set in among the political elite. First Vice- 
President don Pedro Alejandrino del Solar was constitutionally 
obliged to assume the presidency, but instead Bermiidez' cabinet 
conferred the powers of the stem on dm Second Vice- President, 
fttstinio BorgoAo. While at first it was asserted that Solar had 
declined the presidency it soon became clear that BorgoAo, and 
Bermttdea' cabinet had purposely barred Solar from power, allowing 
BorgoAo to take office.76 Cfceres ted supported id s  move. Softer, it
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seems, had offered some signs of support for Pidrola in the past, 
supporting him in the War with Chile and, while in the Bermddez 
administration, proposing that Pi<rola be appointed to the Corte de 
Juicio.n  This pro-Pidrola attitude would have worked against 
Cdceres in his effort to enlist assistance from the administration in 
his bid for election. A strike against him that Clceres could not 
afford.
Upon assuming the presidency, BorgoAo dissolved Congress and 
slated presidential and congressional elections for June 3, 1894. In 
addition to this, censorship measures were taken to the extreme in 
Lima.7* And the prisons were filled with political prisoners.79 In 
reaction to these extreme measures both Solar and Valcdrcd went 
into exile to join the opposition headed by Pidrola in Igoifne, Chile. 
There they formed a "coalition cabinet" aeeertiag dmmsefves as a 
genuine opposition force.10 Nevertheless, Cdceeee managed to be 
elected President in an extremely fraudulent election. In addition to 
being the only candidate, and having replaced apposition electors 
with his own hand-picked supporters, the number e l people voting 
was very small siso, with a large number of dm electorate 
abstaining.81 Thus as 1894 drew so •  dose Pern found herenlf again
in the hands of a man she had welcomed as a hero oa% ten yews 
before. But now Clceres heroics had faded from memory while dm 
repressive deeds id Me miiitery regime were stiM fresh io 
everyone's memory.
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It was at this point that the infamous montonera groups 
sprang up throughout the various regions of Peru in opposition to 
Ciceres. Fiorencia Mallon describes the montoneras as "bands of 
armed men organized informally in the countryside to support a 
particular political cause."82 in the central sierra they were formed 
as a result of a meeting held by peasants of the community. Such 
groups elected a merchant or a priest as a leader. This happened in 
1894-93 just as it had under Cdceres in opposition to the Chilean 
invasion. These groups reacted, not with a national conscience, but to 
a local economic and political concern. Because these montoneras 
rose up in force again in 1894-93 it is clear that the overthrow of 
Ciceres had larger implications than just for the exporting elite.
Rather it affected the entire nation.
On the evening of October 19, 1894, a small boat, made for 
travelling within the port, departed from Iquique, Chile en route to 
Peru. Among the passengers on the boat was Nicol&s de Pilrola, the 
ever-plotting revolutionary. Landing at Puerto Cabellos, some 200 
Kilometers smith of Lima in the department of lea, five days later, 
Pilrola began his campaign against the government of Andris 
Clceres.*3 On November 3rd, at the head of a group of montonera 
forces from the South, he waged his first battle, taking the province 
of Chincha in lea.84 As he moved northward with his montoMra 
troops toward Lima, the government began to concentrate its own 
forces there, more than 3000 soldiers, in expectation of a fierce
battle.85 Cdceres was not ready to give up the position he hud 
fought so hard to keep.
Under a dense fog on the morning of the seventeenth of March, 
1895, Pidrola led a force of about 2000 montonera troops in a siege 
on the capital. On this first day of battle they took a number of 
strategic church towers as well as the government palace. The 
fighting stopped as darkness fell. Again the next day fierce battles 
were waged from dawn until dark. On the third day, the 19th, after 
even more fierce battles had been waged throughout the morning, 
the Diplomatic Corps called for a twenty-four-hour truce. With the 
truce, peace negotiations began. It was agreed that Cdceres would 
step down and that an interim government consisting of a five-man 
council would be selected. Two members were to be nominated by 
Cdceres and two by Pidrola. This group of four would then elect the 
fifth men who would serve as president of the council**
As calm returned to the battle-tom capital, the council moved 
into action. It declared that elections for president, vice-president 
mid Congress would take place on dm first Sunday in tone. Soon, 
trade, which had nearly come to a halt due to die rising tensions and 
ferns prior to the attack on Lima, began to revive also with die 
restoration of peace.87 In the election for president, Pidrola received 
4150 of 4310 votes cast. Elected as 1st and 2nd Vice Presidents 
were, respectively, Guillermo Billiaghurst and Augusto Seminario y 
Vdscones.88 Pidrola's inauguration into the presidency on
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September 8, 1895 marked the end of ten years of military 
government and the beginning of Peru's leap into the modern world.
V. Political Strategies in Lima
In 1890, the Minister Plenipotentiary of the U.S. to Peru wrote 
that Pidrola "is considered a dangerous man and the ruling classes 
here will unite to keep him out of the presidency"89 and that " this 
man is regarded as an unscrupulous demagogue by the better class 
of citizens."90 Yet, five years later he became president on a wave of 
popular support. This seemingly dramatic turn of events is 
explained by the convergence of three elements. A primary 
contribution to Pidrola's rise to power was the growing disaffection 
which the Civilista Party had with the Cdcerista Party, most notably 
during Bermudez' administration, which lead to the Democrat - 
Civilista coalition. At the same time the popularity of Cdceres 
military backed government was waning among the general 
populace. Complementing these two was the indomitable spirit of 
the ever-present Pidrola, who had sought control over the reins of 
government for twenty years, beginning with his first attempted 
coup in 1874.
The monied class (represented by the Civilistas), as Julio Cotier 
asserted, did not have the political influence in 189S to put the 
apparatus of government to its own designs.91 The Civilistas had a 
history of alliances with the various elements of government which 
held political sway at the time.92 Thus, after Cdceres came to power 
in 1886 the Civilistas cooperated with his administration in an aim
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to improve their political and economic position. But during the 
Bermddez administration they opted to join with the influential 
Valcircelistas in opposition to the weakening Bermddez government. 
Finally, as the elections of 1894 drew near they formed a coalition 
with Pidrota and the Democrats in order to overcome the power of 
the entrenched Cdceristas, bringing Pidrola one step closer to 
achieving his goal.
The poor reputation of this Cdcerista government aided Pidrola 
in his bid for power. In 1886, as Cdceres began his first presidency, 
Peru, for the first time in a number of years could breathe a sigh of 
relief. The strife of the civil war between Ciceres and Iglesias and 
the ravages of the Chilean occupation were now behind them. The 
new military-backed government established order and put Peru 
back onto the right track of peacetime activities. Throughout his 
tenure, Ciceres made steady if painful improvements. These 
included an effort at reducing debts and stabilizing the currency, 
and the signing of the Grace Contract, which reestablished access to 
international markets.93 But under the administration of president 
Morales Bermddez the tide began to tum. As another four years of 
military supported rule ensued, the people began to tire of the 
restrictions they felt. In response to growing dissent Bermddez 
reacted with oppression, such as his replacement of anti-Cdceristas 
electoral council members with pro-Cdcerista figures. When Cdceres 
himself then attempted to return to the presidency after Bermddez' 
death, the popular support he had enjoyed from groups such as the
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montonera forces in the Battle of La Brelia, was not only lacking, 
these people simply would not allow it. And who better to offer 
their support to than Pidrola, who instantly championed their cause? 
Thus, the declining popularity of Cdceres played right into the hand 
of Pidrola, who stood ready to play it.
But Pidrola was not the only political leader interested in 
ousting Ciceres. What of the Civic Union leaders including Rosas, 
Valc&rcel, or the deposed Vice-President Solar? The difference 
between Pidrota and these men was that he had been planning for 
this moment for many years while they had simply come upon the 
situation. In his repeated attempts at overthrowing the government 
he had cultivated the skill for such ventures. His tenacity at this 
undertaking had situated him in a prime position to take on the 
mission. Throughout the years he had built up a type of legendary 
reputation for his activities. In the rebellion of 1893 he had but to 
implement these well honed skills in order to overthrow the Ciceres 
government. But this aspect alone would not have been enough. It 
was only in complement to the other factors that his revolutionary 
skills were rendered effective. Thus, with the combination of 
Civilista support, universal anti-C£cerista support, and his own 
constancy and revolutionary energy, Pidrola went from the ranks of 
a "dangerous man" to a celebrated president in a matter of five 
years.
Of these three, the element of greatest political import was the 
signing of the coalition by the Democrats and the Civilistas, who now
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were known as the Civtc Union after joining with the Valcdrcelistas 
in 1892. Although Pidrola had been offered a part in a coalition 
with the Constitutionalist party, in which CAceres would take the 
presidency, he had rejected it asking only for the "fulfillment of the 
law" on CAceres part.94
This was precisely the goal of the coalition PiArola did make 
with the Civic Union- "the fulfillment of the law." The coalition was 
not a joining of the party elements themselves, rather it was a 
joining of forces to form a "watch-dog" group to insure free and fair 
elections. Its aim was very specific. It was formed to insure that 
the presidential election in 1894 was carried out legally. Toward 
this goal the coalition identified five objectives. The first was a 
simple statement of their purpose: to insure a free and legal election. 
The second was equally important. It made clear the fact that both 
parties were completely free to designate their own candidates for 
the election. Thus, the coalition was not made to eliminate 
competition. Rather its aim was to make the competition fair. And 
in this vein the coalition was aimed directly at the Constitutionalist 
Party which, it was suspected, might corrupt the elections to itt .urc 
its own success. The third point was more a formality, stating that 
the head of the coalition would be the head of the Democratic Party 
(Pidrola). The fourth point was a direct appeal to the president to, 
appoint a three-man council consisting of one man from each of the 
Democrat, Civic Union and Constitutionalist parties to oversee the 
elections and insure their fairness. In addition to this he was to
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implement a law of direct suffrage and set the elections for June.
And the final point was an invitation to the constitutionalists to join 
the coalition. This coalition represented the Democrat and Civic 
Union joint effort to insure a fair and peaceful transition of power.
With the signing of the coalition in 1894 between PiArola and 
th Civic Union, both sides sought to gain. For PiArola this was a 
means of legitimating his rally to oust CAceres with the political 
support of the Lima commercialist elite. For the Civic Union the 
Democrats represented an additional force which they could employ 
to pressure CAceres into holding a legitimate election. If the 
elections were fair the Civic Union stood a good chance of winning a 
large number of positions, judging from their previously large 
numbers in Congress. The signing of the coalition marked an 
outward sign of solid opposition to the CAcerista government.
As early as 1890 it was said of PiArola that '.  . . he has a very 
wide following among the lower and uneducated classed, and . . .  the 
church people look upon him with favor."9* But while he held the 
support of the masses PiArola seems to have been lacking in support 
in Congress. As mentioned above, in the elections of 1890 all but 
one of the Senators were Civilista (the exception being First Vice- 
President Alejandrino del Solar), and the majority in the House of 
Representatives were CAcerista.9* There is no mention of Democratic 
Senators or House members. Thus, through the coalition with the 
Civic Union, PiArola forged and invaluable link to Lima politics. As 
for the Civic Union, while they obviously had some sway in
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Congress, this influence was blocked by the Cicerista administration, 
which was more interested in perpetuating itself than in working 
with the the Civic Union.97
Through a coalition with the Democrats, the Civic Union availed 
themselves of an opportunity to place a new, possibly more 
receptive administration into office. If the coalition was successful, 
the Civic Union realized that this would mean that the Democrats 
had a stake in the new government as well. But, in looking at the 
alternative of a renewed CAceres presidency, the Civic Union had 
much to gain, even if the new administration were Democratic. The 
Democrat's program came much closer to that of the Civilistas than 
the Constitutionalists. In addition, (judging from its representation 
in Congress before the 1894 elections) the Civic Union was assured 
of regaining a substantial number of seats in Congress during the 
election which would balance out a Democratic executive branch. 
Thus, for the Civic Union the coalition was a positive move also.
But this coalition, formed to achieve the short-term goal of free 
and legal elections evolved into a full-fledged joining of forces after 
CAceres usurped the presidency. The friendly bonds that had been 
formed between these two groups became solid as their opposition 
grew more threatening. As the civil war began, these two parties 
were working in unison to coordinate the montonera forces 
throughout the provinces. Thus while Oswaldo Seminario, an ardent 
PiArolista, lead montonera troops in the North, Mariano NicolAs
ValcArcel leader of the Civic Union, helped to lead the battle in the 
South.’*
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VI. The Regional Fighting Forces (Montoneras)
Politics centered around events in Lima, but included the 
involvement of the rest of Peru. In fact, during the civil war of 189S, 
nearly all of the activity took place outside of Lima, with only the 
culminating battle occurring in the capital. Thus, it is vital to look at 
the role that the provincial sectors of Peru had in bringing about 
Clceres' overthrow as well as Pidrola's influence here.
Pidrola himself was not from Lima, but from Arequipa, a 
department which had a long history of involvement in national 
politics. By the time of the civil war of 1895 Pidrola was no stranger 
to revolutionary activity and had developed a strong network of 
support." The leaders of the montoneras and of the Democratic 
Party in the provinces were often educated men who were 
landowners, businessmen, or politicians.100 But while they were the 
driving force of the party, this group alone could not undertake a 
civil war. They could be successful in union with the local peasant 
communities though. It is here that the "Principles" of the Democratic 
party take on their importance. While Pidrola was a "congenital 
aristocrat who shunned close contact with the multitude. . . (he) 
paternalistically sought to ease the suffering of the poor and protect 
their limited rights.”101 Thus, part of the policies of his party had an 
inherent appeal to the lower classes. The Democrats claimed that 
"public institutions ought to put as a top priority the betterment of
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the moral and material conditions of the poor. In addition to this, 
Pidroia proclaimed himself the "protector of the Indian race," stating 
that if any Indian should have his rights violated, he should seek out 
Pidrola himself for assistance.102 Through methods such as this the 
Democratic party was able to win over the lower class •- montoneras, 
who were faced with the alternative of Cicerista repression
Although party policies are more concrete ground on which 
these montoneras could base their support, Pidrola won much 
support as a result of his own charisma which constantly inspired the 
men onward. For the average man especially, Pidrola was like a 
legend. With the tales of his heroic deeds during the war with Chile, 
of his undaunting leadership in his numerous rebellions, and of his 
bravery in battle and concern for the down-trodden, the people 
became caught up in romanticism. Pidrola was a messiah in the eyes 
of the masses claimed Josd Calves in his work "1895."103 Pidrola 
could make men move with his words. He once gave a speech in 
Peru in which he dilivered the famous quote "Our fathers gave us 
freedom (made us free), the charge has been bequeathed to us to 
make ourselves grand.104 Although it is difficult to relay the essence 
of a man through words, one biographer, Alberto Ulloa divined, in his 
own terms, the meaning behind the endearing title "Califa" (Caliph) 
which was given to Piltola. Ulloa saw "Califa" as a romantic title, and 
"expressive of faith, which were confused, imprecise but shining 
memories, thoughts, attitudes: his battles, his speeches, his galloping 
horse, the road travelled towards the horizon, time , die
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representation of God, a people looking toward the point where their 
hopes lie."103 This was the embodiment of Nicolds Pidrola, imprecise 
but very real in the impact he had on the people of the Peruvian 
provinces.
It is clear that the civil war of 1894-9S involved the whole of 
Peru with montonera bands forming across the country in opposition 
to Cdcerista forces.106 However, it is not easy to determine which 
group these montonera forces represented. Were they purely 
peasant groups? Did they include merchants and white collar 
workers? Who stood to gain the most from the ouster of Cdceres? 
There had been purely Indian uprisings in I88S in Ancash, with the 
Atusparia uprising. But the scale of this uprising was nowhere near 
that of 1895.107 The civil war of 1895 was a large scale political and
social upheaval. The people were not coerced into battle they
entered with a will to overcome their alienation by a clientelistic
system which allowed political access and financial advantage only to
a privileged few. Basadre offers insight into a number of motivations 
the montoneras had for taking up arms: hatred of abusive
authorities, vengeance against an extortionist state apparatus, the 
waste of the ruling regime and, on a more emotive level, the prestige 
of local montonera leaders, the legend of Pidrola as "Caudillo of the 
people", and the "romantic desire for a Peru that's more just, healthy, 
clean... better ."10* Thus , just as in any conflict this civil war had its 
practical, critical aspects as well as its romantic side.
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Yet most importantly, this rebellion was one with political 
power motivations tied in with the events centered in Lima.109 This 
is seen in the universality of the uprising and its effective 
organization, shown most clearly in the simultaneous convergence on 
Lima by forces from the North, Center and South. The U.S. Envoy to 
Peru observed that the montonera groups are a coalition of groups on 
the "outs" with Cdceres government.110 This statement reinforces the 
view that because these montonera forces were barred from access 
to political power in the provinces, and oppressed by the military 
regime, they took up arms to rectify the situation. This represented 
a new chapter in national politics. While montonera groups had risen 
up previously to fight for local concerns, they had never been 
organized on a national scale. Through the networking of Civilista 
and Democratic support, the center managed to coordinate these 
pockets of local opposition into a national event.
In the North the adamant Pidrolista supporter Oswaldo 
Seminario took up the cause in 1194 with his brothers Ricardo, 
Eduardo, Teodoro and Edmundo and his uncle Augusto.111 Oswaldo 
Seminario had been trained as a lawyer and had practiced in Lima.
He had been a Senator in Lima representing the department of Pidra 
on the extreme north coast for several terms by the time of the civil 
war in 1894-93. He also owned a large farm in Pidra. It is very 
obvious that Seminario and his family benefitted directly from their 
activity in the war. In 1895, after the final confrontations Oswaldo 
was elected as a Representative while his uncle, Augusto was named
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Prefect of Piilra.112 Seminario's forces fought in Pi lira using sabotage 
as a weapon. They cut telegraph wires and cut off train 
transportation by damaging the rails.113
Simultaneously, montonera forces were rising up in 
Lambeyeque and Ancash, coastal departments just south of Pi lira, 
but north of Lima. By July of 1894 the Department of Lambeyeque 
* as reported to be under montonera control.114 But, moving closer 
to Lima, the department of Ancash proved harder to subdue for the 
montoneras. Led by Carlos de Pidrola, brother of Nicotis, the 
montonera forces rose up en masse upon the reelection of CAceres to 
the presidency. These people were unwilling to endure another four 
years of military supported rule. CAceres' attempt to suppress this 
revolt only incited the montoneras further. As local support for the 
local government in HuarAz washed away, with only CAceres to back 
it up, the government collapsed.119 Here again was a situation where 
political power was an issue. After a majority of the citizens took up 
arms against the CAcerista supported local government, it became 
clear that the government of HuarAz had no local support and had 
only retained power through its links to CAceres. And by October of 
1894 Seminario and his forces had occupied the town of Huacho 
which lay only 80 miles north of Lima.116 Thus, after the straggle to 
topple the local CAcerista powers, the forces from the North began 
converging near Lima to take the ultimate political prize, the capital.
In the Central provinces of Peru, the primary montonera leader 
was Augusto Durand. He was the first to "raise the banner against
the military regime."117 In mid-1894 he was named by Pidrola as 
Military and Political Chief of the Departments of the Center, an 
undertaking which he accepted with honor.118 Starting in the 
serrano mining town of Cerro de Pasco with 200 men, Durand 
worked his way south, attacking numerous towns along the way, for 
a period of seven months. At the end of this campaign he had 2000 
montoneras under his command and was prepared to march on Lima 
with Pidrola.119
Of course the central sierras are precisely where Ciceres had 
raised Ms montonera fighting groups only ten years before this 
event. But in 1894 in place of these were Cicerista soldiers and in 
opposition to these soldiers were some of the very montoneras who 
had fought by Cdceres side against the Chileans ten years before.120 
By 1888, according to MaMon, it became obvious to the montonera 
forces who had fought with Cdceres that he had abandoned them not 
intending to reward them for their assistance with either access to 
political power or financial resources.121 Thin, with the battle call of 
Durand on one side and their apparent neglect by Cdceres on the 
other these montonera forces had seemingly little choice but to act in 
an effort to bring about a change for their betterment. In addition to 
this, through his creation of districts and hand-picked 
representatives, Cdceres had excluded a number of merchants and 
politicians from access to political power.122 With the outbreak of 
the rebellion, these people who had been excluded were given the 
opportunity to redirect the power network in their favor and gladly
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took it. So, just as in the Pidrolista North, access to political power 
played a role in the formation of the mor.toneras in the Center, while 
the legacy of La Brefla played a role as well.
As the North and the Center were steeped in battle, the conflict 
in the South began to pick up momentum as well. Although there 
were a number of montonera leaders here, it was the montonera 
band of Eduardo Yessup that made a sweep across the South.
Starting in Puno, on lake Titicaca in the southeast, Yessup and his 
men next attacked the far southern coastal town of Moquegua, then 
swept northward, finally capturing Arequipa on 27 January, 1895.123 
At this point Yessup was ready to join with Pidrola's forces who had 
taken the town of Chincha in the northern province of the 
department of lea which lay just south of the department of Lima. 
The base from which the attack was to be launched was the town of 
Cineguilla in the department of Lima.124
As with the other provincial areas, information on this region 
in toms of political preferences and economic conditions is scarce. 
But some conclusions may be drawn. In one study of the area, it is 
noted that the landowning, farm goods production class tn the South 
maintained its precapitalist system, but that members of a new 
commercial class were beginning to emerge who were tied to the 
international market.125 Under the restrictive Ciceres regime, this 
group had been isolated from political power, having come onto the 
scene too late to obtain access to his tightly run political network. 
They had no means at their disposal to achieve greater commercial
50
success. Thus, with the advent of the coalitional campaign it was to 
the advantage of this group to offer its support, at least financial, if 
not in manpower. In addition to this, Pidrola had the support in his 
home department not only of the lower classes, but also of the 
aristocracy.136 Thus, in the South, the budding commercialists 
jumped at the opportunity for a piece of the pie while the masses 
gave full support, as the aristocracy (at least in Arequipa) looked on 
approvingly.
During the first months of 1893, tensions in Lima grew while 
the montonera forces gathered from all directions. The impetus to 
the civil war had been created in the capital city, and its conclusion 
was to take place there, but if it were not for the innumerous battles 
fought and won over time by the montoneras in the provinces, the 
events in Lima would have had much less significance. The 
montoneras represented the national aspect of this civil war. While 
each region had its particular problems to which these montonera 
groups formed in response, it became obvious that these problems 
were the result of a national crisis centered in Lima, and not only a 
regional issue.
SI
VII. The Coalition in Government.
After the civil war had come to an end no more mention is 
made of the Civic Union. Because this coalition between the 
Valcdrcelistas and the Civiiistas was formed with the election of 1894 
in mind it lost its importance after this point. Although no mention 
is made of a formal dissolution it is logical to assume that, the time 
for its purpose having passed, the members of this coalition then 
pursued their own paths. The path that the Civiiistas pursued was 
that of forging a new government in conjunction with Pidrola.
While the niocrat-Civilista coalition was effective in bringing 
about the overthrow of Cdceres, they next had the task of forming a 
new and viable government. With Pidrola's election to the 
presidency this task was underway. But which of the varied support 
groups would this administration come to represent, and who would 
get lost in the shuffle?
In answering this question it must first be determined what 
the goals of each of the two parties in the coalition were. The 
Democratic party has been described above as the "party of the 
people" and in a sense it was. More correcdy it was a party guided 
by the upper class but taking in the considerations of the poorer 
classes, where its electoral support lay.127 This party also favored 
the southern provincial cities, because this was the home of many
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of them. The Civilistas, on the other hand represented the coastal 
exporting elite and the commercial bourgeoisie of Lima. Yet, with 
slight differences the aims of these two parties were not that far 
apart. Both parties held in high regard the theories of economic 
liberalism, wished to follow an export development model, and drew 
their leadership from the wealthier classes.128 Thus, in forming the 
coalition these two parties had more difficulty in patching up old 
personalistic feuds than in compromising on political programs.
As this coalition established a new government it also 
implemented new reforms. In an important move Pidrola adopted 
the gold standard for the Peruvian currency. This stimulated foreign 
capital as a result of a stabilized exchange rate. In addition to this 
Pidrola called in a French military mission to professionalize the 
armed forces.129 And in keeping with this reform pattern, in 1896 
Pidrola established a committee to revise the electoral laws. The new 
electoral law became Title VIII of Article 90 of the constitution, 
reading "The president of the Republic will be elected by direct 
suffrage in the form prescribed by the law".129 Finally the coalition 
had achieved direct suffrage for the country. Therefore, on coming 
into office the coalitional administration managed to set things in 
motion in order to bring about changes that the leadership of both 
parties supported.
Yet, even if the party leaders were comfortable with the goals 
they were setting and the development paths they were taking, what 
of their constituents? Upon coming into office Pidrola was quick to
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adopt a favorable stance toward the importation of capital to 
improve the export sector. He also raised no objection to the Orace 
contract, which he had so adamantly opposed as a sellout at its 
signing.131 While these moves were in keeping with the aims of the 
constituents of the Civilista party they did not satisfy the needs of 
the artisanal and proletariat classes who supported the Democrats.
In addition to this, Pidrola went against a prior vow when, after 
imposing a salt tax he sent a military mission to put down the Indian 
uprising which resulted .132 The irony is clear. The "protector of the 
Indian race" who had promised to safeguard the Indian from abuse, 
sent a military mission to brutally extinguish their uprising. Thus 
upon coming to power Pidrola wasted little time in distancing himself 
form the very group who had fought to bring him to power.
The effect of this attitude by Pidrola was the strengthening of 
the Civilista party. Upon coming to power Pidrola made the conscious 
choice to support the exporting elite sector. In doing so he was 
directing his government to satisfy the needs of the Civilistas. As the 
economy turned around and this sector became stronger they would 
eventually no longer need the support of the Democrats. This has 
prompted Basadre to observe that "The governing class which had 
overthrown a military regime by using the popular caudillo, 
discarded this caudillo when the right moment arrived, and seized 
control of political power."133
But the most important question to ask in evaluating the new 
government which replaced Clceres is: "What had changed?" In this
case the two greatest changes that came about were in economic 
activity and the political atmosphere. Whereas Ciceres, and 
Bermtfdez before him were more concerned with maintaining the 
status quo, the Pidrolista government had as one of its goals, export 
development. Thus, while Bermtidez or Ciceres may have weakened 
the export sector by taxing it to compensate for poor finances, Pidrola 
would encourage it to invest in order to increase profits in this way, 
rather than tax it directly.
As for politics, it was clear under Bermddez and Clceres both 
that in order to effectively accomplish anything, one had to be among 
those who were connected politically, either in Lima, or as districts 
heads in the provinces. Under the Pidrola administration this was 
not so true, litis attitude can be seen in his policies, such as his 
support for direct suffrage, and in the freedom with which he 
allowed the coastal elite to operate financially. Thus, with the Pidrola 
administration the government in Lima took on a sense of security 
about itself and its position in the scheme of things.
Upon the rise to power of the Democratic party the nature of its 
support system became more clear. The founders and leadership of 
this party were generally of the wealthier class, being from Lima as 
well as having a large concentration in Arequipa. This group 
represented the more traditional of the Peruvian upper class and this 
fact manifested itself in some aspects of their party's program. The 
must distinctive of its traditional views was its sense of paternalistic 
duty to the tower classes, especially the Indians. Because of these
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values this party emphasized the betterment of the Indian's 
condition and Pilrola donned himself "the protector of the Indian 
race. But, v'hen it came to acting on the interests of the party, 
Pidroia considered his most immediate friends and allies of the 
aristocratic class, forgetting it seems, his own and his party's 
commitment to the Indian and the lower classes. Thus, the activities 
Pidrola's administration undertook represented the interests of the 
Civilista Party as well as the elite segment of the Democratic Party, 
but neglected the concerns of the lower and middle class elements of 
the Democratic Party.
VIII. Conclusion
The Civil war of 1894-95 in Peru was a result of a complex 
combination of elements. The most apparent element acting in this 
war was the coalitional force formed oetween the Pidrolistas • 
Civilistas. Initially beginning as a vehicle to bring about electoral 
reform this compact became the guiding force behind the campaign 
to bring to an end the militaristic Cdceres government.
The tools by which this coalition achieved this goal were the 
provincial fighting forces, or montoneras, which rose up across the 
nation in opposition to Cdceres. These forces rose up for various 
reasons; often for economic of political gain, but also out of 
frustration against the repressive regime of Cdceres. Throughout the 
war there was a constant cooperation between the central leaders of 
the coalition and the regional forces, with the ultimate goal of 
converging on Lima. And it was under the inspirational leadership of 
one man, Nicolds de Pidrola that all of this came to fruition. As 
someone remarked during his exile in Chile shortly before his return 
to Peru: "without Pidrola's immediate presence the revolution could
fail."134 It was just such a personality that the times needed in order 
to draw together the variant elements in opposition to the Cdceres 
regime.
Yet, on coming into power, the Pidrola administration did not 
fulfill its obligation to all of its constituents. Pidrola opted intstead to
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support the commercial interests of the Civilistas and the upper 
echelons of the Democratic Party. He proved unable or unwilling to 
address the interests of the lower classes of Peru, even though it was 
with their help that he had obtained power.
But the Civil War of 1893 takes on an even deeper meaning 
when the implications of the event are considered. In their effort to 
do away with the oppressive militarism of the Clceres regime this 
coalitional force, in union with the montoneras brought about the 
birth of modem Peru. In her new cooperative and more open 
government, Peru began to involve herself in the pursuit of progress. 
With the imposition of direct suffrage, the importation of new capital 
for the exporting sector and a stable political atmosphere Peru 
launched into a new era.
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